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Articles

THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT
OF 2003 AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Allan Ides*
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA),
signed into law on November 5, 2003, by President Bush/ bans
the use of partial-birth abortions throughout the United States
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. Specifically, section 1531(a) of PBABA provides:
Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. This subsection
does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a
life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from
the pregnancy itself. This subsection takes effect 1 day after
2
the enactment.

Section § 1531(b) defines the term "partial-birth abortion" 3 and
extends coverage of the prohibition to any "individual" who per* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to Bill Araiza, David Burcham, Brietta Clark, Brannon Denning, Kurt Lash,
Karl Manheim, Christopher May, and Robert Pushaw for their helpful comments and
criticisms.
I. See 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1540 (Nov. 5, 2003).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 153l(a) (West 2004).
3. "[T]he term 'partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the
case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the
mother, or, in the case of a breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past
the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an
overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and
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forms a partial-birth abortion, regardless of whether that person
is a licensed medical practitioner. 4 The phrase "partial-birth
abortion" is highly charged and designedly so. It is the preferred
usage of those who object to the dilation and extraction method
of abortion as inhumane. I use the phrase "partial-birth abortion" throughout the text simply because it is language adopted
by PBABA.
Congress passed similar bans in 1996 and 1997, both of
which President Clinton vetoed. 5 Three years after the second
veto, and while Congress was considering a third version of the
ban, the Supreme Court decided Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 holding
that Nebraska's prohibition on partial-birth abortions unduly
burdened a woman's right to choose. Despite Stenberg, congressional efforts to ban partial-birth abortions continued. Unquestionably Congress was fully aware of Stenberg and its potential
constitutional im~lications when it revisited the issue and passed
PBABA in 2003. Not too surprisingly, debate on the constitutionality of PBABA compared this statute with the ill-fated Nebraska statute, contesting whether PBABA also imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose. 8 My focus, however, is
on a separate constitutional concern, namely, whether PBABA
represents a valid exercise of the commerce power, the expressly
identified authority under which the statute was enacted. 9 On
this seemingly significant question, the legislative record is relatively spare and the post-enactment debate largely silent.

(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1) (West 2004).
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(2) (West 2004).
5. H.R. Doc. No. 104-198, at 1 (1996) (President Clinton's veto message on the
1996 legislation); H.R. Doc. No. 105-158, at 1 (1997) (President Clinton's veto message
on the 1997 legislation).
6. 530 u.s. 914 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 6-24
(2003) (discussing Stenberg); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16-22,
25, 32 (2003) (same); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2002: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2-3, 15, 19,
21-25,30,41,47-48 (2002) (same).
8. It was on this basis that three district courts temporarily enjoined enforcement
of PBABA. See Jonathan Groner, Challengers to Abortion Law Rally Around the Precedent, LEGAL TIMES, November 10, 2003, at 3; see also Nat'! Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft,
287 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Neb.
2003).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 34 (2003) (PBABA constitutional authority
statement).
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It is possible that the constitutionality of PBABA will be resolved without any reference to the commerce power. That possibility depends, however, on the stability of the Stenberg decision. While principles of stare decisis lend support to that
stability, Supreme Court Justices have been known to shift and
modify their views in the abortion context. Any variation between the Nebraska statute and PBABA could tilt a swing Justice in an unanticipated direction. Moreover, no one can accurately predict what the composition of the Court will be if and
when PBABA arrives there for review. Thus, given the possibility of either doctrinal shift or personnel change at the Supreme
Court, one cannot disregard other potentially dispositive constitutional issues. Certainly if the Stenberg majority does not hold,
the question of congressional power might become central to the
controversy. But perhaps more importantly, if the doctrine of
enumerated powers is to be taken seriously, some thought ought
to be given to the enumerated power that ostensibly serves as
the basis for this enactment, if for no other reason than a respect
for constitutional structure. Sound constitutional analysis dictates that the power to legislate be established before subjecting
an act of Congress to external limits such as those imposed by
the due process clause.
In what follows, I suggest that the constitutionality of
PBABA is subject to serious doubt under surrent commerce
clause doctrine. That is not to say that PBABA is "clearly" or
"plainly" unconstitutional. The nuances of the Rehnquist
Court's commerce clause doctrine are yet to be fully developed,
and just as the Court's decision in Stenberg can be revised, so too
can the Court's approach to the commerce clause. And, of
course, reasonable minds can differ at the outer edges of application. But given the Rehnquist Court's most recent pronouncements on the commerce clause, one cannot help but conclude
that PBABA represents, at best, a very poor effort to craft a
piece of legislation in conformity with the obvious and applicable elements of constitutional doctrine.
BASIC COMMERCE CLAUSE STANDARDS
BRIEFLY CONSIDERED
Pursuant to the commerce power, Congress may regulate
both interstate commerce and certain activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. As to the regulation of interstate
commerce itself, Congress is empowered to regulate the chan-

444

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 20:441

nels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as
thinRs or persons in or using those channels or instrumentali0
ties. Since the New Deal, the Court has not found a single "first
category" exercise of the commerce clause to have exceeded the
scope of the granted power. The same cannot be said of the second category. Under the category involving the regulation of
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress
does not direct its power at interstate commerce itself, but at
matters outside commerce which nevertheless influence it. In
this context, the modern Court has imposed discernable limits on
congressional power, and one sitting Justice has even suggested
that the category is without constitutional justification and ought
to be abandoned. 11 The first question, therefore, is whether
PBABA regulates interstate commerce itself, and hence is relatively immune from judicial oversight, or whether it merely regulates matters that affect interstate commerce, potentially subjecting the statute to more active judicial oversight.
PBABA prohibits the performance of any partial-birth
abortion "in or affecting interstate ... commerce. " 12 At first
blush, this language may suggest that the statute represents an
exercise of both aspects of the commerce power, the regulation
of interstate commerce itself-the performance of a partial-birth
abortion "in" interstate commerce-and the regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce-the performance of a partial-birth abortion "affecting" interstate commerce. Yet, it is doubtful that word "in" as used in PBABA
signifies an attempt to regulate the channels or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce. For one thing, it is not clear how a partial-birth abortion could be performed "in" interstate commerce
in any but the most bizarre circumstances. Nor does the phrasing
of the statute ("a physician who, in ... interstate ... commerce,
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion") sensibly apply to a
physician who travels in interstate commerce and then performs
a partial-birth abortion. Rather, the language connotes that it is
the performance of an abortion itself that must take place in in10. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
II. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 860 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined
by Scalia, J.) (expressing "no view" on whether the federal arson statute may constitutionally be applied to all buildings used for commercial activities).
12. 18 U.S.C.A. § 153l(a) (West 2004). The statute also pertains to matters in or
affecting foreign commerce. There being no discernible difference between interstate
commerce and foreign commerce for these purposes, the discussion in the text is fully
applicable in the foreign commerce context as well.
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terstate commerce. In any event, the "affecting" interstate commerce language would seem perfectly suited to cover the "traveling" physician. Hence, I take the "in or affecting" language as
embracing the performance of partial-birth abortions that in
some manner affect interstate commerce. In other words, I will
treat PBABA as an instance of the second category of commerce
regulation, the so-called "substantially affects" test.
In United States v. Lopez 13 and United States v. Morrison, 14
the Court, for the first and then the second time in almost sixty
years, restricted the breadth of the "substantially affects" test. In
both cases, the Court held that Congress exceeded its commerce
power by attempting to regulate matters that were noneconomic
and that had at best an attenuated connection with interstate
commerce. 15 The two key questions under Lopez/Morrison are,
first, whether the regulated activity is economic and, second,
whether that activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
These questions, although distinct, are intertwined in the sense
that a. negative answer to the first question, if not wholly dispositive, makes a negative answer to the second significantly more
likely. Our answer to the second question may also be informed
by the presence or absence of congressional findings or a statutory jurisdictional element, and by whether the regulated activity
is one that has been traditionally left to the states.
I turn now to the first step of the Lopez/Morrison analysis,
namely, the economic activity element.
IS PERFORMANCE OF A PARTIAL-BIRTH
ABORTION ECONOMIC ACTIVITY?
Lopez held that gun possession in a school zone was not
economic in any conceivable sense of that word. Morrison arrived at the same conclusion with respect to gender-based violence.16 A key factor in each case was the absence of an element
of commercial exchange embedded in the respective statutory
scheme. Had the Gun Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) required possession with the intent to sell, the economic nature of
13. 514U.S.549(1995).
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
15. See Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563 (2001).
16. I do not agree with Court's perception of the noneconomic nature of the crimes
in Lopez and Morrison. See id. at 567-70. But regardless of my views, clearly Lopez and
Morrison state the law to be applied in this context. Hence, whether a particular activity
is "economic" can only be measured by the standards explicit and implicit in those cases.
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the regulated activity in Lopez would have been established. Interestingly enough, the defendant in Lopez was planning to sell
his gun. That's why he brought it to school. But this fact was irrelevant to the Court's characterization of defendant's conduct
as noneconomic since application of GFSZA did not require any
such showing. In other words, GFSZA regulated only the noneconomic part of the defendant's transaction, namely, his possession of the gun, and simple possession, in the Court's estimation,
was noneconomic. Stated somewhat differently, from a constitutional perspective, the fact that Lopez himself was on an economic mission was irrelevant in the absence of an economic
statutory element.
The performance of a partial-birth abortion bears a close
resemblance to the noneconomic possession of a gun. Just as
possession of a gun can occur without any commercial element,
the performance of a partial-birth abortion-indeed, the performance of any medical procedure-can be accomplished without a commercial overlay. It may be that most medical procedures, including partial-birth abortions, are done for hire. But
this does not alter the simple fact that the procedure itself, unadorned by any commercial exchange, is noneconomic in the
same sense as is gun possession. And just as GFSZA did not include an intent-to-sell element, PBABA does not require that
the abortion be performed for hire. In other words, PBABA
regulates only the noneconomic part of the transaction, namely,
the performance of the medical procedure. If simple gun possession is noneconomic, then the performance of an abortion, unadorned by a commercial element, must be similarly characterized.
The constitutional analogy between gender-based violence
and partial-birth abortions leads to the same conclusion. The
Violence Against Women Act (V AWA), the statute at issue in
Morrison, imposed no commercial overlay on its regulation of
gender-based violence. Of course, an act of gender-based violence is in no way dependent on the presence of a commercial
transaction. The same is true of a partial-birth abortion. By way
of contrast, there are some activities, and some crimes, that are
inherently commercial. Perez v. United States 11 provides a useful
example. In that case, the Court rejected a commerce clause
challenge to a federal statute, the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, which criminalized extortionate credit transactions. An ex17.
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tortionate credit transaction is inherently commercial since it involves the extension of credit. As a consequence, the Consumer
Credit Protection Act can be fairly described as a regulation of
economic activity and in this sense is quite distinguishable from
VA W A. PBABA much more closely resembles VA W A in this
regard than it does the Credit Consumer Protection Act. In
other words, there is nothing inherently commercial about either
performing an abortion or engaging in gender-based violence.
As a consequence, neither activity is economic as the Court used
that word in both Lopez and Morrison.
Does the fact that a physician performing a partial-birth
abortion provides a service to the patient alter the conclusion
that the regulated activity is noneconomic? After all, the provision of a service does represent a type of unilateral transfer of
wealth, even when the service is provided gratis. Still, this type of
"economic" transfer lacks the commercial characteristics the
Court deemed critical in Lopez and Morrison. Hence, while gun
possession, which involves neither service nor exchange of any
kind, is distinguishable from the performance of abortion in this
respect, the distinction has no constitutional significance. Neither activity is commercial; hence, neither is economic. As a consequence, the service character of a partial-birth abortion should
make no constitutional difference unless the Court is inclined to
extend its economic activity test beyond its current foundation.
The potential distinction between service activities and nonservice activities is further undermined when one compares the
physician's service under PBABA to the gender-based violence
regulated under VA WA. Clearly, gender-based violence cannot
be characterized as a service. Rather than doing something "for"
somebody, the perpetrator is doing something "to" somebody.
Yet this verbal play between prepositions merely underscores
the constitutional similarity between these activities. Both the
performance of an abortion and the infliction of violence involve
physical interaction between human beings. Moreover, the entire thesis of PBABA is that the performance of a partial-birth
abortion is an act of violence. Indeed, the doctor is not being
punished for the service he provides, but for the crime he commits when he kills the fetus. In other words, he is punished for
what he does "to" the fetus. Thus, the prohibition of partial-birth
abortions, under the reasoning of Morrison, surely falls into that
category of punishing violent, noneconomic crimes beyond the
reach of the commerce power. In short, the fact that the physi-
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cian provides a service does not alter the noneconomic nature of
the activity under Lopez/Morrison.
An activity that is in itself noneconomic may still be treated
as economic if its regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 18 The
classic case is Wickard v. Filburn. 19 There the Court upheld the
power of Congress to regulate wheat grown and consumed on
the farm on the theory that regulation of these activities was essential to the regulation of wheat sold in interstate and foreign
commerce, a target of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
The Court in Filburn accepted the government's argument that
the aggregate effect of wheat consumed on the farm "would
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions." 20
Just as the Filburn rationale was not applicable to GFSZA, there
being no larger regulation of economic activity of which GFSZA
was a part, nothing in PBABA suggests that the prohibition of
partial-birth abortions is part of a larger regulation of economic
activity. Rather, the partial-birth abortion prohibition is a standalone measure designed to address what its proponents see as an
immoral act, independent of any larger economic or commercial
considerations. In the words of the Lopez Court, "It cannot ...
be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities
that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce. "21 To rule otherwise would be to grant Congress a
general police power like that of the states, and this is something
the Court is quite unprepared to do.Z 2
Of course, if PBABA applied only to abortions-for-hire, the
resulting commercial overlay would transform the otherwise
noneconomic act of abortion into economic act of abortion-forhire. Yet nothing in PBABA expressly imposes such a limiting
construction. Perhaps one could interpret the phrase, "in or affecting interstate commerce," as designed to accomplish that
end. There are, however, at least two obstacles to this interpretation. First and most pertinently, the language simply does not
carry that meaning. In Justice Scalia's words, "A text should not
be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 128.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
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should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly
means." 23 The evident meaning of the "in or affecting" language
pertains to the location of or consequences generated by the
matter regulated, and not to the nature of the regulated activity.
The Rehnquist Court's decision in Jones v. United States
supports this conclusion. 24 At issue in Jones was the scope of a
federal arson statute that prohibited the arson of a building
"used in" interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce. 25 In construing the statute to apply only to the
arson of commercial buildings, the Court distinguished between
a statute that broadly defined the crime "as the explosion of a
building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate
commerce" and one that required that the damaged or destroyed property "must itself have been used in commerce or in
an activity affecting commerce. " 26 In the former context, the "affecting interstate commerce" language would embrace both
commercial and noncommercial activities-that is, all activities
that might affect interstate commerce. In the latter context,
however, the "used in" terminology limits the scope of the proscription to the destruction of commercial facilities. As the Jones
Court phrased it, "The key word is 'used."' 27 PBABA, quite
clearly, contains no language limiting the scope of the affects test
and, therefore, falls into that category of statutes that purport to
embrace the broad array of activities, both commercial and noncommercial, that might affect interstate commerce. Since
PBABA was enacted after the 2000 decision in Jones, we may
fairly assume that Congress drafted PBABA in light of this judicially crafted distinction.
Second, and closely related, the key doctrinal development
in Lopez and Morrison was the distinction between the nature of
the re~ulated activity and its potential effect on interstate commerce. 8 To interpret the phrase "in or affecting interstate commerce" as pertaining to the nature of the activity fails to account

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997).
529 u.s. 848 (2000).
18 u.s.c. § 844(i) (1994).
529 U.S. at 854.
27. !d.
28. Justice Breyer's dissent in United States v. Morrison rejected the majority's economic activity test, in part, because of the obvious fact that noneconomic activity can also
substantially affect interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 655, 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
majority did not deny this assertion; rather, it rested on the formal distinction between
economic and noneconomic activity and on the historical fact that the Court had never
validated a congressional regulation of noneconomic activity. 529 U.S. at 611 n.4.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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for this doctrinal separation and confuses the effect on interstate
commerce with the nature of the activity being regulated. To
adopt this broader interpretation would be to eviscerate both
Lopez and Morrison, for if any activity that affects interstate
commerce is by definition an economic activity, then the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity becomes irrelevant. In short, the "in or affecting interstate commerce" language cannot be fairly read as limiting the scope of PBABA to
abortions-for- hire.
The congressional confusion on this score is reflected in the
House report accompanying PBABA?9 According to that report, "[t]he provision of abortion services, including partial-birth
abortions, is clearly commerce. "3° For this proposition, the report relies on a statement of former Attorney General Janet
Reno. That statement, however, was issued before the decision
in Lopez, and, more importantly, is premised on the economic
transactions related to the provision of those services. The authors of the report were, perhaps, making the same type of assumption when they stated, "the performance of a partial-birth
abortion, as with the performance of any abortion, is an economic transaction in which a service is performed for a fee. " 31 Of
course, this statement is both imprecise and incorrect. The performance of an abortion is itself noneconomic unless that performance is rendered for a fee. This lack of precision in the congressional report reflects a misunderstanding of Lopez and
Morrison that may well have adversely affected the drafting of
PBABA.
Of course, Congress could rewrite PBABA to include an "abortion-for-hire" requirement, but that possibility merely underscores the
fact that Congress did not do so. Interestingly, Congress was notified
of this problem early on in the legislative process. In testimony before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Louis Seidman explained:
Here, as in Lopez, the regulated activity is not "economic."
Having an abortion is no more a commercial activity than
possessing a gun. True, most (although by no means all) abortions are purchased, and Article I probably does reach legislation that would prohibit the payment of money for certain
types of abortions (at least in cases where an effect on inter29.
30.
31.

The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58 (2003).
/d. at 23.

ld. at 24.
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state commerce can be shown). But most guns are also purchased. Just as Congress can regulate the interstate purchase
of guns, but not the intrastate possession, so, it would seem, it
can regulate the interstate purchase of abortions, but not the
intrastate procedure itself. 3

Congress chose to ignore this concern. In any event, for present
purposes, the only question is whether PBABA is constitutional,
not whether a hypothetical statute yet to be drafted might itself
pass constitutional muster.
DOES THE NONECONOMIC CHARACTER OF THE
ACT OF PERFORMING OF AN ABORTION
PRECLUDE REGULATION OF THAT ACTIVITY
PURSUANT TO THE COMMERCE POWER?
The short answer is that it probably does, at least under the
watchful eye of the current Court. Those seeking to invoke the
commerce power in this context would do well to heed the words
posted over Dante's Gate of Hell: "Lasciate ogne speranza, voi
ch'intrate." 33 ("All hope abandon, ye who enter here.") True,
neither Lopez nor Morrison imposed a categorical rule against
the regulation of noneconomic activity. Yet the tenor of both
decisions comes very close to making the barrier all but impenetrable. In the words of the Morrison Court, "While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in
our nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature." 34 In Lopez, the Court stated the matter somewhat differently: "Where economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained." 35 Of course, this affirmative recognition of the power
to regulate economic activity does not necessarily negate the
power to regulate noneconomic activity, but given the context of
this quotation, it is clear that the Court was attempting to draw a
circle within which congressional power would be validated and
outside of which the exercise of such power would, at the very
least, be suspect. There is no hint in either Lopez or Morrison
32. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 190, 193 (1995) (prepared statement of Louis Michael
Seidman).
33. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, The Inferno: Canto 3, /. 9.
34. 529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
35. 514 U.S. at 560.
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that the Court is looking to alter this historical fact. Rather, both
decisions tend toward the creation of an enclave of activity immune from congressional regulation. At the very least, the noneconomic nature of a regulated activity presents a strong presumption that the activity is beyond the reach of the commerce
power, leading to a type of commerce clause scrutiny that may
well be "strict in theory, but fatal in fact. "36
Of course, the Supreme Court hasn't said, "Never," and so
the door to regulation of noneconomic activity pursuant to the
commerce power is certainly not double-bolted. Let us assume
then that the noneconomic character of the regulated activity is
not wholly dispositive, that there remains at least a possibility,
albeit remote, of overcoming the presumption of unconstitutionality. Presumably that possibility would require that the challenged statute be distinguishable in some significant way from
the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison. There are four questions, each examined in Lopez and Morrison, that might serve as
a basis for discovering a constitutionally relevant distinction:
First, has regulation of the activity been traditionally left to the
states? Second, did Congress make findings pertaining to the
perceived effect of that activity on interstate commerce? Third,
does the statute include a jurisdictional element? Fourth, does
the activity substantially affect interstate commerce? I turn now
to these questions to determine if PBABA can be distinguished
effectively from GFSZA and VAW A.
IS THE ACTIVITY REGULATED BY PBABA
ONE THAT HAS BEEN TRADITIONALLY LEFT
TO THE STATES?
In Morrison, the Court explained its holding in part by observing that "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local." 37 This quote, I believe, captures the essence of Lopez and Morrison. These decisions reflect an effort to cabin the power of the federal government by recognizing an enclave of traditional state authority
insulated from federal interference. I have argued elsewhere that
the economic activity test serves as a proxy for this reinvigorated

36. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).

37.

529 U.S. at 617-18.
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principle of federalism. 38 Thus, one way to determine whether an
activity is "truly national" or "truly local" is to examine the
potential economic character of that activity. Noneconomic
activity is presumptively (or perhaps definitively) "truly local"
and hence beyond the power of Congress. A second way to
measure the nationaVlocal distinction is more direct. Simply ask
whether the regulation of the activity at issue has traditionally
been left to the states. If so, principles of federalism may prevent
Congress from invading this province of state prerogative. For
example, in Morrison the Court found that the regulation of
violent crime was truly a matter of local concern:
In recognizing this [distinction between what is truly national
and truly local] we preserve one of the few principles that has
been consistent since the [commerce] Clause was adopted.
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is
not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province
of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of
the police power, which the Founders denied the national
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression
39
of violent crime and vindication of its victims.

We have already concluded that the performance of a partial-birth abortion is noneconomic. Is the regulation of that activity also one that has been traditionally reserved to the states? In
other words, is the regulation of this medical procedure something that can be fairly characterized as a truly local concern? I
believe the answer to this question is "yes" for three reasons.
First, as the sponsors of PBABA recognized, the activity being
regulated-the performance of a partial-birth abortion-is a violent crime, namely, the killing of a fetus. 40 The proscription applies not only to licensed medical practitioners, but also to any
"individual" who performs the prohibited act. Moreover, the intrastate act of aborting a fetus is not directed at instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce. In this
sense, PBABA reaches into what the Morrison Court perceived
as the quintessential example of state prerogative, namely, the

38. See Ides, supra note 15, at 578-80.
39. 529 U.S. at 617-18.
40. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 5
(2003) (describing state laws proscribing partial-birth abortions as "criminal bans"); see
also The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 172, 173, 186 (1995) (prepared statement of Douglas W. Kmiec)
(describing partial-birth abortions as homicides).
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suppression of violent crime, "which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States. " 41 Second, in
the Court's own words, albeit in a slightly different context, "the
field of health care [is] a subject of traditional state regulation. "42
That is not to say that the regulation of economic activity within
the field of health care is absolutely immune from federal regulation.43 But the regulation of the noneconomic aspects of medical
procedures may well be, given both the tradition of state prerogative in this field and the absence of any "truly national" interest in this subject area. Third, the regulation of abortions,
both before and after Roe v. Wade, 44 has remained the exclusive
province of the states subject only to the Fourteenth Amendment. While Congress, in the exercise of its spending powers,45
has imposed limits on the federal funding of abortions, the actual
regulation of abortions has remained a state prerogative.
In short, the activity regulated by PBABA is both noneconomic and, by tradition and constitutional design, a matter
that has remained within state prerogative. In Morrison, the
Court observed, "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to
our decision in that case." 46 Consistent with this observation, the
constitutionality of PBABA may turn on the noneconomic, truly
local nature of the conduct being regulated. At the very least,
the intersection between the noneconomic nature of the regulated activity and the traditional role of the states in regulating
that activity creates a strong presumption against the constitutionality of the congressional effort to regulate it.
DID CONGRESS MAKE FINDINGS PERTAINING
TO THE PERCEIVED EFFECf OF PARTIAL-BIRTH
ABORTIONS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE?
As part of its "independent evaluation of constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause" the Court will "consider legislative
findings, and indeed even committee findings, regarding effect

41. 529 U.S. at 618.
42. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,237 (2000).
43. Cf New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 705 (1995) (establishing a presumption against federal regulation of
health care as a field traditionally left to the states).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding authority of Congress
to refuse to fund abortions under Medicaid).
46. 529 U.S. at 610.
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on interstate commerce." 47 The goal of this examination is to
illuminate the congressional judgment that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. Such findings are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish constitutional validity.
The more extensive the findings and the more detailed the evidentiary support, however, the more likely it is that a court will
incorporate the congressional judgment into its application of
the substantially affects test. 48
PBABA does include extensive findings. 49 However, none
of those findings pertain to interstate commerce. Rather, they
are designed as a response to what Congress perceived as the erroneous factual predicate of the Stenberg decision and to the legal question of whether the Court ought to defer to these alternative congressional findings. The House report accompanying
PBABA does contain a brief description of the perceived effect
on interstate commerce, 50 and certainly a federal court would
take that discussion into account when applying the substantially
affects test.
According to the House report the performance of a partialbirth abortion has the following effects on interstate commerce:
"[B]ecause so few abortionists perform partial-birth
abortions, women seeking to obtain a partial-birth
abortion are more likely to have to travel out-of-State
to find an abortionist willing to perform the procedure."51
"[P]artial-birth abortions are usually performed in an
outpatient clinic or facility which is likely to 'purchase
medicine, medical supplies, surgical instruments, and
other supplies produced in other States. "' 52
"[A]bortionists who perform partial-birth abortions
advertise their services across state lines. " 53
Taken as a whole, these three assertions provide a clear picture of what the authors of the report perceived as the potential
effects on interstate commerce-namely, interstate travel, pur47. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
48. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964).
49. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat.
1201, 1201-06 (2003).
50. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-58, at 24-25
(2003).
51. /d. at 24.
52. /d. at 25.
53. /d.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

456

[Vol. 20:441

chases, and advertising. That outline of potential interstate consequences is certainly clear enough to direct a court toward asking the right questions. For example: How much travel interstate
is generated by the performance of partial-birth abortions? What
is the extent of interstate purchases related to the performance
of partial-birth abortions? To what extent is the interstate advertising of abortion services related to the procurement of partialbirth abortions? The report, however, provides insufficient factual information to begin to answer these questions. To extent
that these assertions can be deemed "congressional committee
findings," at best they direct our attention toward the questions
to be asked but not toward the answers. That is a valuable service, of course, but not one that comes close to resolving the
constitutional issue presented.
DOES PBABA INCLUDE A JURISDICTIONAL
ELEMENT AND, IF SO, IS THE PRESENCE OF
THE ELEMENT SUFFICIENT TO VALIDATE THIS
EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER?
As to the first question, the answer is "yes." The "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" language creates a jurisdictional element that requires the government to prove a connection with commerce in every prosecution under PBABA.
The inclusion of this element distinguishes PBABA from the
statutes in both Lopez and Morrison, neither of which included
any reference to interstate commerce. The question then becomes whether the inclusion of this jurisdictional element is, in
itself, sufficient to sustain PBABA. I think not for two related
reasons, one general and the other specific to PBABA.
First, nothing in either Lopez or Morrison suggests that the
presence of a jurisdictional element automatically guarantees a
statute's constitutionality. The Lopez Court saw the value of a
jurisdictional element as a device that could limit the reach of a
statute "to a discrete set of" activities that "have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. "54 But the Lopez
Court did not hold or even suggest that the presence of such an
element was sufficient to sustain the exercise of congressional
power. The resolution of that question requires at least some examination of the jurisdictional element at issue. Similarly, in
Morrison, the Court, noting the absence of a jurisdictional ele-

54.

514 U.S. at 562.
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ment in VA WA, observed that the inclusion of such an element
"would lend support to the argument that [a particular prohibition] is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce." 55 To say that an
item lends support to a proposition is not to say that this item establishes that proposition. In short, from the Court's perspective,
the presence of a jurisdictional element is useful, but neither
necessary nor sufficient to sustain any particular exercise of the
commerce power. That brings me to my second point-namely,
the insufficiency of PBABA's jurisdictional element.
Some jurisdictional elements may fully resolve the constitutional inquiry. For example, a statute that made it a crime to engage in gender-based violence on an instrumentality of interstate
commerce would surely be sustained as a "first category" regulation of interstate commerce, for the jurisdictional element fully
embraces the entire constitutional standard. 56 PBABA's jurisdictional element does not, however, fully embrace the applicable
standard. The phrase "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" is notable for its failure to include the adverb "substantially," a word that the Lopez Court found to be constitutionally
significant.
Within this [affecting commerce] category, admittedly, our
case law has not been clear whether an activity must "affect"
or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate it under the commerce
clause. We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our
case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether
the re~~lated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.

Even if a prosecutor could show that the performance of a particular partial-birth abortion affected interstate commerce, it
would not necessarily follow that this abortion substantially affected interstate commerce. Nor would the satisfaction of this
element establish that partial-birth abortions as a class satisfy the
substantially-affects standard. In other words, the jurisdictional
element does not resolve our constitutional dilemma for the simple reason that it does not ask the right question.

55. 529 U.S. at 612; see also id. ("Such a jurisdictional element may establish that
the enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce.") (emphasis added).
56. 529 U.S. at 613 n.5.
57. 514 U.S. at 559 (citation omitted); accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
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Perhaps an example will help. Suppose a woman drives
from Iowa to Nebraska to procure a partial-birth abortion. A
reasonable argument could be made that the performance of the
abortion affected interstate commerce-but for the abortion the
woman would not have engaged in interstate travel. Yet this
"reasonable argument" does not establish that the commerceaffecting abortion substantially affected interstate commerce or,
more importantly, that such abortions as a class exert such an effect. Indeed, a single trip across the state line would seem rather
trivial. In any event, PBABA's jurisdictional element does not in
any fashion resolve the critical question-namely, whether the
performance of partial-birth abortions, either singly or in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Hence, PBABA's jurisdictional element merely limits the
scope of the proscription to commerce-affecting abortions; it
does not validate the legislation as a measure that regulates matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. Given that
PBABA's jurisdictional element does not resolve the constitutional dilemma, we move to the final question.
DO PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE?
In Wickard v. Filburn, 58 a farmer sought to enjoin enforcement of a marketing penalty imposed on "that part of his 1941
wheat crop which was available for marketing in excess of the
marketing quota established for his farm" under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA). 59 The penalty resulted from the
farmer having sowed an excess of 239 bushels of wheat, which
were then consumed on the farm. Among other things, the
farmer argued that enforcement of the AAA against him was inconsistent with the commerce clause since the impact on interstate commerce of his 239 bushels of farm-consumed wheat was
by itself trivial. After discussing the economics of the interstate
wheat market, the Court disagreed:
The effect of consumption of homegrown wheat on interstate
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop. Consumption on the farm where grown appears to vary in an amount
greater than 20 per cent of average production .... The effect
58. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For a detailed discussion of Filburn and its current relevance, see Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003).
59. 317 U.S. at 113.
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of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be
produced for market and the extent as well to which one may
forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own
needs. That appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial. ... One of the primary purposes of
the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat
and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect
the market. It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a
substantial influence on price and market conditions .... This
record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have
considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if
wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing !ts purpose to
stimulate trade therein at increased prices. 60

The Lopez Court described Filburn as supporting the
proposition that Congress may regulate intrastate, noneconomic
activity when the regulation of that activity is "an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated." 61 Under such circumstances, the aggregated effects
of the intrastate, noneconomic activity can be considered in determining whether the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. 62 The key is the presence of some larger economic
scheme at which the regulation is directed. The Court refused to
apply this principle in Lopez since GFSZA had "nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise." 63 In other
words, because there was no larger economic scheme at stake,
aggregation was not permissible. The Court also refused to apply
Filburn's aggregation principle in Morrison, where it reiterated
its view "that, in every case where we have sustained federal
regulation under the aggregation principle ... the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character. "64 In short, under Filburn, and consistent with Lopez and Morrison, application of the aggregation principle requires that either the

60.

61.
62.
63.

64.

/d. at 127-29.
514 U.S. at 561.
/d.
/d.
529 U.S. at 611 n.4.
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regulated activity itself be economic or that its regulation be part
of a larger regulation of economic activity.
Given that the activity regulated by PBABA- the performance of a partial-birth abortion-is noneconomic, and that its
regulation is not in any manner part of a larger regulation of economic activity, Lopez and Morrison bar a court assessing the
constitutionality of PBABA from considering the aggregate effects of partial-birth abortions on interstate commerce. Rather,
the entire focus of the inquiry in any particular case must be on
the single act on which the prosecution is based-namely,
whether this specific partial-birth abortion substantially affected
interstate commerce. Here, a variant of farmer Filburn's argument regarding trivial effects should prevail since the effect of
any single partial-birth abortion on interstate commerce is likely
to be insubstantial.
Even if one were to aggregate the effects of partial-birth
abortions on interstate commerce, it is not clear that the substantially affects standard could be satisfied. The problem here is not
conceptual, as it was in Lopez and Morrison where Congress
sought to "pile inference upon inference" to establish the requisite connection with interstate commerce. 65 Under PBABA
there is no apparent need to pile inference upon inference. Instead, the "committee findings" in the House report accompanying PBABA focus attention on a relatively discrete causal chain
between the performance of the abortion and interstate commerce. What is lacking under PBABA is a factual predicate sufficient to establish that the effect on interstate commerce is substantial. As noted previously, the key questions requiring factual
elaboration are: How much travel interstate is generated by the
performance of partial-birth abortions? What is the extent of interstate purchases related to the performance of partial-birth
abortions? To what extent is the interstate advertising of abortion services related to the procurement of partial-birth abortions? Without the facts necessary to answer these questions, we
cannot fully assess the connection between the performance of a
partial-birth abortion and its effect on interstate commerce. At
this point those facts have not been introduced into the defense
of the statute.
In addition, to determine whether the performance of partial-birth abortions in the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce, we will need to know how many such abortions
65.

514 U.S. at 567; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
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are performed. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court observed that
"[t]here are no reliable data on the number of [partial-birth]
abortions performed annually. Estimates have ranged between
640 and 5,000 per year." 66 A survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, a pro-choice organization, put the number at 2,200 for
the year 2000, which is up from 363 in 1996. 67 Pro-life advocates
put the number somewhat higher. From a purely economic perspective, regardless of whose statistics one credits, these are not
particularly large numbers given the overall size of the U.S.
economy. One wonders whether they are sufficient, even in the
aggregate, to establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce. By way of contrast, the Filburn Court concluded that
wheat grown for consumption on the farm varied "in an amount
greater than 20 per cent of annual [wheat] production" 68 and
"that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market
conditions." 69 The Court went on to detail why this was so.
Significantly, the Lopez Court described Filburn as "perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity." 70 That being the case, the significantly
weaker argument that partial-birth abortions exert a substantial
effect on interstate commerce would seem to fall well short of
the historical reach of the commerce power over intrastate activity. Of course, as I've noted several times, even this observation
generously assumes that the Court will even consider the substantially affects argument given the noneconomic nature of the
regulated activity.
CONCLUSION
The primary weakness to the claim that PBABA represents
a valid exercise of the commerce power is that the activity regulated by PBABA- the performance of a partial-birth abortionis noneconomic as that term has been used by the Rehnquist
66. 530 U.S. at 929.
67. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States,
/995-/996, FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECfiVES, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 263, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3026398.html (363 D&X abortions in 1996);
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United
States in 2000, PERSPECfiVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCfiVE HEALTH, Jan./Feb. 2003,
at 6, 13, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/joumals/3500603.html (2,200 D&X
abortions in 2000).
68. 317 U.S. at 127.
69. /d. at 128.
70. 514 U.S. at 560.
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Court. Under Lopez and Morrison, this flaw is quite likely fatal
to the claim of congressional power. And even if not fatal, the
presumption of unconstitutionality established by the noneconomic nature of the regulated activity is further bolstered by a
combination of the traditional role of the states in regulating violent crime and health care and by the relative weakness of the
argument that partial-birth abortions substantially affect interstate commerce. To counter this presumption, PBABA's proponents will, at the very least, have to develop a factual record that
fairly establishes the substantial relationship between the performance of partial-birth abortions and interstate commerce.
Yet the noneconomic nature of the regulated activity may make
it doctrinally impermissible to aggregate effects and thereby
eliminate the possibility of using even a post hoc rationalization
to satisfy the substantially affects test. In addition, while the
presence of a jurisdictional element may lend some support to a
claim of constitutionality, the jurisdictional element in PBABA
falls short because it fails to require that the effect on commerce
be substantial. Finally, it is also worth keeping in mind that Justice Thomas may not be willing to validate any exercise of congressional power under the substantially affects test, potentially
aligning himself with the "liberal" wing of the Court in a challenge to PBABA. 71

71.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).

